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RES IPSA LOQUITUR FOR ANIMALS ON THE HIGHWAY?
— by Neil E. Harl*
A continuing liability problem since the advent of
motorized transportation early in this century for those
raising livestock has been who bears responsibility for
the damages caused when a vehicle strikes a farm or
ranch animal on the highway.1  The doctrine of
negligence is, of course, central to determinations of
liability.2  However, in recent cases the question has
been raised as to whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
may be applied to cases involving farm or ranch animals
on the highway.3  The answer to the question is of
substantial importance to parties to livestock liability
cases.
The Doctrine
The concept or doctrine4 of res ipsa loquitur means,
essentially, that the instrumentality or transaction
“speaks for itself.”5  Thus, the facts and circumstances
surrounding an accident causing injury or damage may
be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an
inference, of negligence on the part of the defendant. 6  In
most jurisdictions,7 if it is shown that the instrumentality
causing the injury or damage in question was under the
exclusive control or management of the defendant, the
accident was not due to any voluntary action on the part
of the plaintiff and it is shown that in the ordinary course
of events the injury or damage would not have happened
had due care been utilized, a presumption or inference is
raised that, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, the injury or damage was attributable to a
failure to meet the requisite standard of care.8  Stated
differently, the event causing the injury or damage was
probably the result of the defendant’s negligence in the
absence of credible evidence to the contrary.9  If there is
direct evidence of the precise cause of an event causing
injury or damages, there may be no basis for invoking
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.10
Should the Doctrine Apply to Livestock?
The question of whether the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply to accidents involving farm or
ranch animals on the highway has divided the courts.11
•  In the 1995 case of Fisel v. Wynns,12 the plaintiff’s
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pickup truck struck a black cow standing on the
roadway.  The cow had strayed onto the county road
through an open gate.  After striking the cow, the
plaintiff got out of her pickup and was struck by a
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.
At trial, there was evidence that the defendant’s land
was fenced but a gate was found open following the
accident.  Testimony indicated that the latch could only
be manipulated by human hands.  The defendant
remembered using and closing the gate the preceding
day.  There had been no visitors after the gate was closed
and latched, there was no showing that cattle had
escaped on prior occasions and there was no testimony
that there had been trespassers in the past.
The plaintiff argued that changing conditions have
altered public policy since a 1973 case had been decided
requiring a showing of at least negligence to establish
liability against a livestock owner in such situations13
under a state statute.14
The court in Fisel v. Wynns15 reaffirmed its earlier
belief16 that the state legislature chose to require a
showing of negligence and declined to ease the burden
on the plaintiff on policy grounds.17
•  In the same year, 1995, the Nebraska Supreme
Court considered a similar case.18  In the facts of Roberts
v. Weber & Sons, Co.,19 a trucker hauling a semi-trailer
load of salt popped over a railroad overpass and plowed
into a herd of cattle on the highway, striking four of the
animals.
Evidence at trial indicated the animals had been
confined in a feedyard which was fenced with two-inch
pipe.  The defendant’s testimony was that the animals
may have pressed up against a gate, breaking a hinge
and allowing the cattle to escape.  There was testimony
that the fence was secure the day before the accident.
The trial court submitted the issue of res ipsa loquitur
to the jury which returned a verdict in favor of the
trucker for damages.  The Nebraska Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should not be applied to situations of animals on the
highway which had escaped from a pen.20
The Nebraska Supreme Court said that it was an
error on the part of the Court of Appeals to hold that the
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doctrine was inapplicable to all escaped livestock cases.
Rather, the Supreme Court stated that whether the
doctrine should be invoked should properly depend upon
whether the requirements of the doctrine were met— (1)
whether “the occurrence was one which would not, in
the ordinary course of things, happen in the absence of
negligence,” (2) whether the instrumentality was under
the exclusive control and management of the defendant
and (3) whether there was an explanation by the
defendant of how the animals came to be on the
highway.  The Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the
first two conditions were met and the third was a
question of fact for the jury and the jury did not believe
the defendant’s explanation.  Therefore, the doctrine was
properly invoked.
•  In the latest case, also in Nebraska,21 the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was invoked with the jury returning a
verdict for the plaintiff in excess of $1 million.  The case
involved a collision of a car with a steer that had
apparently escaped from a pasture and wondered onto a
state highway.
Conclusion
Aside from the fact that leadership in the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has come from
Nebraska, an important livestock-producing state, the
broader issue is the range of consequences expected to
flow from the Nebraska decision if followed in other
jurisdictions.  Certainly it will affect— (1) the level of
insurance carried by livestock farmers and ranchers; (2)
the cost of such coverage, in all likelihood; (3) the
attention given to fences and gates, in terms of
construction, maintenance and monitoring; and (4) the
preparation of cases for trial.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was a riding student of one
defendant and was injured while riding a horse owned
by the other defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants were negligent in allowing the plaintiff to
ride their horse in an unknown area with hunter-jumper
tack instead of dressage tack. During a maneuver, the
horse bucked and threw the plaintiff and then kicked the
plaintiff. The defendants argued that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of being thrown and kicked. The court
found that, before the plaintiff got on the horse, the
plaintiff was aware of the wrong tack being used and
still rode the horse. The court also found that the
plaintiff was an experienced rider, well aware of the
risks involved in riding horses. The court held that the
plaintiff had assumed the risk of the injury suffered and
dismissed the suit. Young v. Brandt, 485 S.E.2d 519
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor filed for Chapter
13 and served notice of the filing on the IRS. After
notice was served, the IRS served a levy on the debtor’s
bank account. The debtor informed the IRS about the
bankruptcy filing but the IRS refused to return the
levied funds. As a result of the levy, the debtor was
unable to make mortgage payments and incurred legal
fees charged by the mortgagee and legal fees to defend
against the mortgagee and to bring the current suit
